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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 1991, the United States Supreme Court determined that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")1 no longer protects United States citizens
from discrimination by United States companies, if the discrimination takes place
outside of the United States.' This decision leaves many Americans without pro-
t After this article went to the publisher, Congress enacted significant amendments to section 701 (f) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), and section 101(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12111(4). Civil Rights Act of 1991, section 109.
* Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. The author would like to thank Prof. D. Benjamin
Beard for his insight, Peggy Rasmussen for her sanity and Lisa Jones for her promptness. ©
1.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988).
2. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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tection against employment discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, color,
religion or national origin, and must be remedied by Congress. Dictum in the
opinion calls into question the extraterritorial application of the new Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").' This new act should also be amended to
avoid uncertainty.
In its March decision Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
American Oil Co. ("Boureslan"),' the Court narrowly interpreted Title VII despite
authority requiring broad interpretation of the statute, and strengthened a previ-
ously weak and reductionist rule of construction. 5 Boureslan is one in a series of
decisions limiting the scope of Title VII. To combat this narrowing trend, Con-
gress should further modify Title VII to establish that the statute should be con-
strued to benefit groups who have traditionally been discriminated against in a
given job category without unnecessarily trammelling the rights of innocent third
parties.
II. THE Boureslan DECISION
Ali Boureslan is a naturalized American citizen. 6 He was employed as an engi-
neer in July 1979, by Aramco Services Company ("ASC"), a subsidiary of Ara-
bian American Oil Company ("Aramco").7 Aramco is a United States corporation
whose principal place of business is in Saudi Arabia.8
Mr. Boureslan started working for ASC in Texas and in November 1980, was
transferred to Aramco in Saudi Arabia.' "[His] troubles began"1" in September
1982, when his supervisor allegedly began harassing him about his national ori-
gin, race and religion." Relations deteriorated, resulting in his termination in
June 1984.12
Mr. Boureslan sued under both Title VII and state law. 3 Aramcos'4 response
was to move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Title
VII does not apply to Mr. Boureslan's employment in Saudi Arabia, and that the
state law claims should be dismissed for lack of pendent jurisdiction. " The district
3. Id. at 1236 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213)(Supp. 1991))).
4. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), Boureslan v. Aramco, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990)(en banc), affg, 857 F.2d
1014 (5th Cir. 1988), affg, 653 F Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987). Boureslan was consolidated with EEOC v. Ara-
bian Am. Oil Co. and Aramco Services Co., Nos. 89-1838 and 89-1845. See infra note 24.
5. Boureslan, I llS. Ct. 1227.
6. Id. at 1229.
7. Id. at 1230.
8. Id.
9. Id.




14. For convenience, both defendants will be referred to as "Aramco" or "defendants."
15. Boureslan, 653 E Supp. at 629.
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court granted Aramco's motion,16 and its decision was affirmed by a three-judge
panel of the Fifth Circuit.17 The decision was also affirmed by the Fifth Circuit en
banc. 1  Five circuit judges disagreed with these decisions.19
Mr. Boureslan gave the Supreme Court its first opportunity to rule on the issue
of extraterritorial application of Title VII,2" and six members of the Court de-
clared that the language of the statute is insufficient to allow for its application to
acts committed abroad.21
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began his analysis by stating
the rule of Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo ("Foley"),22 which provides that unless a
contrary intent appears, a statute is intended to have only domestic application.23
The question then becomes whether such a contrary intent appears in Title VII.
Mr. Boureslan and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC,"
collectively "petitioners")24 argued that such contrary intent could be found in the
broad definitions of the jurisdictional terms "employer" and "commerce" as well
as in the implications of the "alien exemption" provision, 25 and that the Court
should defer to the EEOC's interpretation that the statute applied extraterritori-
ally.26 The majority concluded "that petitioners' evidence, while not totally lack-
16. Id.
17. Boureslan, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988).
18. Boureslan, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990).
19. Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274-82 (King, J., dissenting); Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021-34 (King, J., dissent-
ing).
20. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., I 10 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
Justice Antonin Scalia addressed the issue before joining the United States Supreme Court. In his capacity as
Assistant Attorney General he testified before Congress:
With respect to discrimination in employment by private companies and individuals, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, as amended, prohibits a broad range of "unlawful employment practices" by any private
employer "engaged in any industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees .... "Once
again the [statute] contains an exemption "with respect to the employment of aliens outside any state,"
which implies that it is applicable to the employment of United States citizens by covered employers any-
where in the world.
Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Legislation, Hearings on S. 245 Before the Subcommittee on International Fi-
nance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1 st Sess. 165 (1975)(state-
ment of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att'y Gen., Off. Legal Couns., Just. Dep't.).
In March, 1991, Justice Scalia concurred with the majority, stating:
Given the presumption against extraterritoriality that the Court accurately describes, and the require-
ment that the intent to overcome it be "clearly expressed," it is in my view not reasonable to give effect to
mere implications from the statutory language as the EEOC has done.
Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1236 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Justice made no mention of his statement 17 years
before, although Justice Marshall supported his dissent by quoting his brother justice's statement. Id. at 1245
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
21. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
22. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
23. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
24. The EEOC took the "highly unusual step of seeking intervention at the appellate stage after ... [the Fifth
Circuit panel decision] .. . .If for some reason Mr. Boureslan did not further pursue the matter on appeal, the
Commission would have been left with an unfavorable appellate precedent .. . "Cherian, Current Develop-
ments in Transnational Employment Rights, 40 LAB. L.J. 259, 262-63 (1989).
25. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1230-31. Section 2000e-I of 42 U.S.C. provides in pertinent part: "This sub-
chapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State .. . . "42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970).
26. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1235.
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ing in probative value, falls short of demonstrating the affirmative congressional
intent required to extend the protections of the Title VII beyond our territorial bor-
ders."27
The majority's decision in Boureslan is striking because the reasons given for
rejecting the arguments made by petitioners all eventually come back to what it
called variously a "canon of construction," a "long-standing principle" and a "pre-
sumption. This principle is "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary in-
tent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."29 The majority used this principle as a presumption to tip its analysis of
each of petitioners' arguments; petitioners had the uphill road. At one point Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated: "If we were to permit possible, or even plausible inter-
pretations of language such as that involved here to override the presumption
against extraterritorial application, there would be little left of the presumption."
30
Examination of prior case law indicates that little was left of the presumption until
the Court's recent resurrection of it in Boureslan. "
Foley provides the majority's primary authority for the presumption. In that
case an American citizen worked for an American contractor on a construction
project in Iraq and Iran.32 He sued for overtime pay for work done in excess of
eight hours per day. 3 The issue was whether the Eight Hour Law34 applied to his
situation.35
The plaintiff had several strong arguments. His employer had contracted to
build public works on behalf of the United States .3 The contract the employer had
expressly agreed to required the employer to "obey and abide by all applicable
laws, regulations, ordinances, and other rules of the United States of America."
7
Further, the Eight Hour Law provided for time and a half overtime pay for work
done in excess of eight hours per day by "every laborer and mechanic employed by
any contractor or sub-contractor" performing a public work contract for the
United States.38 Section 324 of the Eight Hour Law also provided:
Every contract made to which the United States ... is a party . . . shall contain
a provision that no laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by
the contract, in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor ... shall be re-
27. Id. at 1231.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949)).
30. Id. at 1233.
31. Two years earlier in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428 (1989), Chief Justice
Rehnquist applied Foley, but the presumption was not determinative in that case. The Court determined that the
sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state was the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id. at 431
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1986)).
32. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,283 (1949).
33. Id. at 283.
34.40 U.S.C. § 324 (1948)(repealed 1962).
35. Foley, 336 U.S. at 282.
36. Id. at 283.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 282-83 (citing 40 U.S.C. §§ 321, 325(a)(1940) (repealed 1962))(emphasis added).
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quired or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon such
work.
39
Finally, an Executive Order4" had been issued which "suspended the law as to la-
borers and mechanics employed directly by the government at Atlantic bases
leased from Great Britain."41 This implied that the President had concluded that
the statute applied to these bases, otherwise no suspension for government em-
ployees would have been necessary.42
Nonetheless, the Foley majority held:
The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, . . . is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional in-
tent may be ascertained. It is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions. We find nothing in the Act itself, as amended,
nor in the legislative history, which would lead to the belief that Congress enter-
tained any intention other than the normal one in this case.
There is no language in the Eight Hour Law, here in question, that gives any indi-
cation of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which
the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control. '
The Foley Court looked to the scheme of the Eight Hour Law, and noted that no
distinction is drawn between alien and citizen laborers." "Unless we were to read
such a distinction into the statute we should be forced to conclude . . . that Con-
gress intended to regulate the working hours of a citizen of Iran who chanced to be
employed on a public work of the United States in that foreign land."4" The justices
also cited legislative history for the proposition that labor matters like wages and
hours are particularly domestic concerns." To further bolster its position, the
Foley Court deferred to the most recent administrative interpretations of the Eight
Hour Law by the Attorney General and the Comptroller General, who opposed ex-
traterritorial application and disagreed with an earlier Attorney General opinion
in favor of extraterritoriality.
47
The highest hurdle for the Foley Court was the "every contract," "every laborer"
language of the statute," which the justices jumped over by stating:
39. Id. at 282 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 324 (1948)(repealed 1962))(emphasis added).
40. Exec. Order No. 8626, 3 C.F.R. 850 (Supp. 1940).
41. Foley, 336 U.S. at 288.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 286.
45. Id. Obviously this reasoning does not apply to Title VII, because the alien exemption provision addresses
this very issue. See supra note 25.
46. Foley, 336 U.S. at 285-86. But see infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
47.Id. at 289.
48. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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Although the statute expressly requires the inclusion in every government public-
works contract of the eight-hour provision, the Secretary of the Treasury has ap-
proved a standard form for construction contracts which contains eight-hour
provisions but which provides that the use of the form will not be required in foreign
countries . . . .The inclusion of such provisions is also required by War Depart-
ment Procurement Regulation No. 3, § 346, in "all contracts subject to the provi-
sions of the Eight Hour Law." Yet neither the instant contract nor others covering
off-continent operations contain the Eight Hour Law clause. Similarly the Depart-
ment of State "does not consider it legally necessary to include provisions of the
Eight Hour Law in contracts to be performed in foreign countries."'
Thus, the Secretaries of Treasury, War, and State could overrule Congress by ap-
proving a form.
The Court dealt with the "every contract" language of section 324 by writing:
"Nothing in the legislative history supports the conclusion . . . that 'every con-
tract' must of necessity, by virtue of the broadness of the language, include con-
tracts for work to be performed in foreign countries."5 The Court discussed an
amendment making the Act apply to dredgers in any river or harbor of the United
States or the District of Columbia."1 The amendment was a response to a court de-
cision holding that dredgers were not covered employees under the act. 2
In its attempt to secure equality of treatment for dredgers on the one hand and labor-
ers and mechanics on the other, Congress would hardly have intended for coverage
over the latter class to extend to the far corners of the globe while coverage over the
former was limited to work performed in rivers or harbors "of the United States or of
the District of Columbia."5 3
Thus, Foley denied extraterritorial application of the law despite several statu-
tory provisions which left room for a finding of congressional intent to cover at
least the situation presented by the facts of the case. The Court took the position
that Congress did not really mean what it said when it used the words "every con-
49. Foley, 336 U.S. at 290 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 287.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 287-88.
[Vol. 11:271
A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT
tract," quoting American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. : "Words having univer-
sal scope, such as '[e]very contract in restraint of trade,' '[e]very person who shall
monopolize,' etc., will be taken as a matter of course to mean only every one sub-
ject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to
catch." 5
Justice Frankfurter went even farther in his concurrence. He candidly asserted
that the economic considerations cited by the Attorney General's and Comptroller
General's opinions against extraterritoriality "ought properly to take precedence
over the literal language of the Eight Hour Law."' 6 But his concurrence revealed
how easily the presumption can be enfeebled. He explained that in the same term
the Court had decided Vermilya Brown Co. v. Connell, 7 which extended the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to foreign conditions, even though that "was an ex-
tension more difficult than that which the Court avoids here both because not ap-
parently compelled by the literal terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
because that Act is not confined in its application to contracts to which the United
States is a party."58
Several reasons have emerged explaining the existence of the canon espoused in
Foley. According to the Court: "It is based on the assumption that Congress is pri-
marily concerned with domestic conditions." 9 Judge Posner, however, cited a dif-
ferent rationale:
54. In American Banana, the plaintiff charged that the defendant had combined with the government of Costa
Rica to interfere with his business, in violation of the Act to Protect Trade against Monopolies. American Ba-
nana, 213 U.S. at 355. All of the alleged acts in issue took place in Panama or Costa Rica where they were not
illegal. Justice Holmes wrote for the majority stating: "[Tihe general and almost universal rule is that the charac-
ter of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."Id.
at 356. In Holmes' view, to hold otherwise would be generally unjust, impliedly because the defendant would not
have proper notice of the illegality of his acts. This argument is not valid in the Title VII context because until the
trial court's decision in Boureslan, the courts and the EEOC were in agreement about Title VII's extraterritorial
reach. American Banana was further complicated because of alleged wrongdoing on the part of the nation of
Costa Rica. The Court was unwilling to engage in "interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary
to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent." Id. at 356. American Banana re-
mains the strongest statement against extraterritorial application of United States statutes. One commentator has
called American Banana "the highwater mark of a territorial limitation on the reach of United States laws. While
the case never formally has been overruled, it is doubtful that it would be decided the same way today." Note,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1009
n.23 (1976).
55. Foley, 336 U.S. at 287 n.3 (quoting American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357
(1909)).
56. Id. at 292 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. 335 U.S. 377 (1948). The FLSA was later amended.
58. Foley, 336 U.S. at 292. The majority's response was that the FLSA specifically covered "possessions" of
the United States, which amounted to a specific direction that the FLSA should apply off United States soil. Id. at
285. Frankfurter used his concurrence in Foley as a vehicle to reargue his dissent in Vermilya-Brown, and finally
to come to the biting conclusion that if he were to follow Vermilya-Brown precedent in Foley he could not
join in reading the narrow phrase "every contract made to which the United States ...is a party" in a
way which departed from its literal terms when the only reason for such a departure is reluctance to attrib-
ute to Congress an intention to interfere in "labor conditions which are the primary concern of a fbreign
country."
Id. at 296.
59. Id. at 285.
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The fear of outright collisions between domestic and foreign law -collisions both
hard on the people caught in the cross-fire and a potential source of friction between
the United States and foreign countries -lies behind the presumption against the ex-
traterritorial application of federal statutes .... 60
Yet another explanation is more historical. One author wrote with reference to
Holmes' opinion in American Banana: "This reticence to give legislation any ex-
traterritorial effect without a clear congressional directive doubtless was enhanced
by the isolationist climate of the United States during the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies. ""
The outcome of Boureslan turns on how strong the Foley presumption is and
what is required to overcome it; this is the major point of disagreement between
the majority and the dissent. The majority admitted that evidence of "contrary in-
tent" need not be expressed by the legislature, for by its terms Foley contemplated
that this "canon of construction . . . is a valid approach whereby unexpressed con-
gressional intent may be ascertained."62 But the Boureslan majority was looking
for a clear expression of an affirmative intention to deal with international condi-
tions or even "affirmative congressional intent." 63 Without that it felt obliged to
presume that Congress was "primarily concerned with domestic conditions."64
III. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENT
A. Weakness of Presumption
The dissent began by accusing the majority of "grossly distort[ing] the effect of
[the Foley rule] of construction upon [the] conventional techniques of statutory in-
terpretation."" This objection to the majority's use of Foley was fundamental, be-
cause Foley "supplies the driving force of the majority's analysis ....
The dissent's prime thrust was at the majority's understanding of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. 
67
[C]ontrary to what one would conclude from the majority's analysis, this canon is
not a "clear statement" rule, the application of which relieves a court of the duty to
give effect to all available indicia of the legislative will. Rather ... a court may
properly rely on this presumption only after exhausting all of the traditional tools
"whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained."6 8
60. Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281 (1949)). This rationale is adopted by the majority in Boureslan with a cite to McCulloch v. So-
ciedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963).
61. Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV.
1005, 1009 n.23 (1976).
62. Boureslan, I lIS. Ct. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949))(emphasis
added).
63. Id. at 1231.
64. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
65. Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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The dissent objected to the majority's "conversion" of the presumption into a
clear-statement rule, 9 by explaining that "[cilear statement rules operate less to re-
veal actual congressional intent than to shield important values from an insuffi-
ciently strong legislative intent to displace them."7" A valid use of a clear statement
rule would include, for example, the requirement that a federal statute manifest a
clear intention to condition participation on a state's consent to waive its constitu-
tional immunity.71 Other examples include cases involving a wholly independent
rule of construction known as the Charming Betsy rule: " '[T]hat an act of Con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.' "72 The dissent accurately pointed out that Benz v. Compa-
nia Naviera Hidalgo, S.A. 73 and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras,74 cited by the majority in support of a strong presumption, actually
turned on the clashing of American and foreign law, as well as on an utter lack of
evidence of congressional intent."
The dissent did refer to the Foley rule as a presumption, but insisted that it could
be overcome with the standard tools used for discerning legislative intent, includ-
ing the words of the statute, legislative history, and comparison with other stat-
utes.7 The dissent also gave much more credence and deference to the EEOC's
position regarding the matter.77
The same struggle to evaluate the strength of the presumption was played out in
the Fifth Circuit Boureslan opinions. 78 The en banc majority stated: "The pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application establishes a high hurdle for
[Boureslan's] arguments to overcome, "' 79 requiring a "clear congressional expres-
sion of intent to the contrary."80 Judge King, who dissented to both the panel and
the en banc decisions, quibbled with the formulation of the presumption adopted
by the majority, by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations81 and by the ear-
lier Fifth Circuit case of State v. Mitchell.82 Judge King could not resist pointing
69. Id. at 1238.
70. Id.
71. Id. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)(interpretation of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
72. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). Judge King, dissenting on the
Fifth Circuit, had already warned of possible confusion of the related but different doctrines of Foley and The
Charming Betsy. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023 n.7.
73. 353 U.S. 138 (1957). "For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." Id. at 147.
74. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
75. Boureslan, Ill S. Ct. at 1239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
78. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1014.
79. Id. at 1021.
80. Id. at 1017.
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987). The Restate-
ment adopted and strengthened the presumption, but also made it by its terms subject to the effects exception. See
infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
82. Boureslan, 875 F.2d at 1021-25 (King, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir.
1977)).
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out: "Though Mitchell cites Steele and Foley Bros. as support for its formulation of
the presumption, neither case requires that Congress' expression of 'contrary in-
tent' be 'clear.' "83
She went on to point out that Foley itself establishes that the presumption need
not be overcome by express language, but may be overcome by any "ascertaina-
ble" congressional intent.84 Thus, "[e]ven if we add the adjective 'clear' to our for-
mulation of the presumption, . . . 'clear' does not mean 'express'......85
B. Marshall's Preferred Result
The dissenters on the Supreme Court would have used the broad jurisdictional
language of Title VII, and more directly, the alien exemption provision, to hold
that "Congress did in fact expect Title VII's central prohibition to have an extrater-
ritorial reach."8
The jurisdictional language of Title VII states that an employer is subject to
Title VII if it has fifteen or more employees and "is engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce."8 7 "Commerce" is defined as "trade, traffic, commerce, transpor-
tation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or between a
State and any place outside thereof .... "88 Respondents had offered several al-
ternative interpretations of this language. 9 The majority judged that: "Each [in-
terpretation of the broad language] is plausible, but no more persuasive than
that."90 The Court then cited two cases in which it had refused to find extraterritor-
ial jurisdiction for statutes which had expressly referred to foreign commerce in
their jurisdictional sections.91 The majority also pointed out that Title VII's juris-
dictional language is "boilerplate" and is included in "any number of congressional
acts, none of which have ever been held to apply overseas."2 More specifically,
the majority included a sentence asserting that "Title VII's definition of 'com-
83. Id. at 1022 n.3 (King, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1022 (King, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (King, J., dissenting).
86. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The crucial difference between the majority and
the dissent is shown here:
While conceding that it is "plausible" to infer from the breadth of the statute's central prohibition that Con-
gress intended Title VII to apply extraterritorially, the majority goes to considerable lengths to show that
this language is not sufficient to overcome the majority's clear-statement conception of the presumption
against extraterritorality.
Id. at 1240.
87.42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1988).
88.42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g)(1988).
89. Boureslan, IIl S. Ct. at 1231. Respondents made the fairly persuasive argument that language in the first
bill considered by the House of Representatives contained the terms "foreign commerce" and "foreign nations",
and that those terms subsequently had been deleted by the Senate before passage. The majority seemed not to be
particularly persuaded by this argument, and listed it last in a paragraph setting forth respondents' arguments. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1232 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)(Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925)(Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act)). These two labor acts are more domestic in focus than is Title VII. See id. at 1241-46
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra note 212 for discussion of Judge King's dissents to the Fifth Circuit opin-
ions.
92. Boureslan, Ill S. Ct. at 1232.
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merce' was derived expressly from the [Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act]""3 which this Court had held, prior to the enactment of Title VII, did
not apply abroad.94 The dissent, on the other hand, agreed with petitioners that
the plain meaning of these words encompassed United States employers operating
beyond United States borders.a
The dissent was even more persuaded that Congress intended Title VII to apply
outside the United States because Congress included the alien exemption provi-
sion.96 Justice Marshall wrote: "Absent an intention that Title VII apply 'outside
any state,' Congress would have had no reason to craft this extraterritorial [alien]
exemption. ""
At least two interpretations emerge from a common sense reading of the words:
"This subchapter shall not apply to ... the employment of aliens outside any
State."" Congress may have intended that the subchapter apply to citizens but not
to aliens outside any State, or that the subchapter apply to aliens inside but not out-
side any State. The Court validated that second interpretation with one sentence in
Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., where the Court found that Title VII pro-
tected aliens within the United States from discrimination., 0 The Espinoza
Court's reasoning on this matter turned primarily on the use of the term "individ-
ual" rather than "citizen" in the jurisdictional definitions of the Act" 1 and, second-
arily, on the alien exemption provision."0 2
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988)("LMRDA"). This statute regulates the internal operations of unions, and
hence is arguably much more domestic in focus than is Title VII. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
94. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1233. This argument by Chief Justice Rehnquist is seriously flawed. He gave no
authority other than McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 15 (1963), for
this proposition. McCulloch dealt with the NLRA, not the LMRDA. The extraterritorial application of the
LMRDA has not been determined, and indeed the question should rarely if ever arise given the LMRDA's con-
cern with internal union affairs. Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of McCulloch is also problematic because that case
determined that the NLRA did not apply on foreign flag ships despite statutory language referring to foreign com-
merce; McCulloch turned on the legislative history of the Act and on conflicts with international law. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in Boureslan, considered only the language of Title VII, and refused to consider either legislative
history or international law. Thus he refused to use the tools allowed by the very case he was citing.
95. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1239 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1242 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at t240 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1233 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- I (1970)). A third suggested reading put forward by respondents
may not be as evident, and, as pointed out by the dissent, may weigh more heavily for petitioners than for respon-
dents. The respondents suggested that the purpose of the provision is to exclude aliens in the possessions of the
United States. "Thus the 'outside any State' clause means outside any State, but within the control of the United
States." Id. The dissent responds:
This explanation may very well be true, but it only corroborates the conclusion that Congress expected
Title VII to apply extraterritorially. Although there is no fixed legal meaning for the term "possession", it
is clear that possessions, like foreign nations, are extraterritorial jurisdictions to which the presumption
against extraterritorial application of a statute attaches.
Id. at 1242 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citation omitted). At any rate the dissent cited evidence that the provision
was drafted with " 'U.S. employers employing citizens of foreign countries in foreign lands' firmly in
mind . . . . "Id. (citing S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964)).
99. 414 U.S. 86 (1973). The case is better known for its holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimina-
tion on the basis of citizenship.
100. Id. at 95.
101.42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970).
102. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 95.
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The dissenting judges rejected the contention that the provision indicates
"merely that aliens are covered by Title VII if they are employed in the United
States,"t"3 and provided Court-watchers with another example of the growing acri-
mony on the Court: "This construction hardly makes sense of the statutory lan-
guage as a whole; indeed, it hardly makes sense."0 4 The dissent considered that
under this analysis the alien exemption provision would be completely superflu-
ous. 1
05
More importantly, the dissent asserted, the legislative history of the alien ex-
emption provision reveals exactly the intent petitioners sought to give it. 06 Several
cases used by the majority had made heavy, if not exclusive, use of legislative his-
tory in determining legislative intent to apply statutes extraterritorially. 7 The dis-
sent therefore seized on statements made by the drafters of Title VII, including
quotes from the Senate Report that the provision was "directed at 'U. S. employers
employing citizens of foreign countries in foreign lands' "and from the House Re-
port explaining that the provision "applies to 'employment of aliens outside the
United States by an American enterprise.' '"08 This answers two of the majority's
questions: Congress was contemplating obligations of enterprises outside the
United States, but was not contemplating any but American enterprises abroad. '09
Other historical evidence strengthened the dissent's position. "The language
comprising the alien-exemption provision first appeared in an employment dis-
crimination bill introduced only seven weeks after the Court decided Foley Broth-
ers [in 19491 . . . . "'11 The Foley Court's refusal to give extraterritorial reach to
the Eight Hour Law was in large part due to the absence of any distinction between
citizen and alien labor." Further, the history of that 1949 alien exemption provi-
sion shows that it was intended to resolve conflicts of law." 2
The majority of the Court had not directly rejected petitioners' construction of
the English language, but had rejected the idea that Congress intended extraterri-
torial application because Congress had failed to address various problems which
would arise from extraterritorial application of Title VII.'' The majority was
103. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1242 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. "In addition to being extremely improbable, such a legislative subterfuge would have been completely
unnecessary, for as we indicated in Espinoza ...Congress clearly communicated its intent to cover aliens work-
ing in this country by prohibiting discrimination against 'any individual.' "Id. (citation omitted).
106. Id.
107. E.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); see supra note
93.
108. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting H.R. RPP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 405, at 4 (1963), reprinted in Civil Rights Hearings on H. R. 405, as amended, before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2303 (1963)).
109. Id.
110.Id. at 1241; see H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
111. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
112. H.R. REP. No. 570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 405, at 4 (1963), reprinted in Civil Rights Hearings on H.R.
7152, as amended, before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2303
(1963)(Civil Rights Hearings).
113. Boureslan. 111 S. Ct. at 1234.
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troubled by the lack of specificity of the statute if, in fact, foreign jurisdiction was
intended. How could an intent to apply the statute to foreign employers be ruled
out? Why no mention of a conflict with foreign laws? Where were the mecha-
nisms for overseas enforcement?
The dissent found these "supposed omissions" to be unpersuasive as arguments
against extraterritoriality." 4 The majority's concern over conflicts with foreign
law was unfounded precisely because the alien exemption provision had been in-
cluded to prevent the most egregious conflicts.' Venue had been addressed by
the drafters so as to accommodate United States enterprises abroad," 6 and the
EEOC's investigative powers are sufficient although not broad. 117 At any rate, ar-
gued the dissent, "there simply is no correlation between the scope of an agency's
subpoena power and the extraterritorial reach of the statute that the agency is
charged with enforcing.""'8
Finally the dissent was astonished by the majority's failure to defer to the
EEOC's interpretation of the clause.119 The question of deference to the adminis-
trative agency charged with interpretation of the statute is beyond the scope of this
article, but was Justice Scalia's sole point of disagreement with the majority.12
IV. FURTHER CRITIQUE OF THE MAJORITY
Justice Marshall persuasively argued that the majority, by failing to look at leg-
islative history and other traditional interpretive tools, applied Foley so that the
presumption became close to a clear statement rule. 12' He also cited congressional
history for an interpretation of the alien exemption provision that indicates a con-
gressional intent to apply Title VII abroad,'22 and he made the point that the
EEOC was entitled to deference.123
But Justice Marshall missed the opportunity to explore fully the weakness of
the Foley canon of construction. Research reveals that the strength of the so-called
presumption waxes and wanes, and significant exceptions exist. The foundations
of the rule are shaky in our modern world, especially in the context of human
rights legislation. One commentator, who has been prolific in his critique of what
114. Boureslan, I II S. Ct. at 1243 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The statutory defense of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1988), has also been interpreted to avoid conflicts of law.
116. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1243 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5((3)(1970) allow-
ing venue in "judicial district in which the [employer] has his principal office.").
117. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1244 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1244-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1236-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. Boureslan, I II S. Ct. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Justice Marshall did not make use of the post-legislative history cited by Judge King in King's dissent to
the Fifth Circuit opinions. In her dissent Judge King stated that when the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") was amended to apply extraterritorially, congressional testimony indicated that the ADEA was being
brought into conformity with Title VII, which the congressmen thought applied extraterritorially. Boureslan v.
Aramco, 892 F.2d 1271, 1281 (5th Cir. 1990)(King, J., dissenting).
123. Boureslan, Ill S. Ct. at 1246 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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could be called the counter-institutional canon, concluded: "The presumption is
an excellent illustration of the danger of self-perpetuating canons of construc-
tion."124 Courts since Foley have articulated more valid tests for determining
whether statutes apply extraterritorially; these tests take into account a broader
range of factors and are more thorough. Justice Marshall also failed to refer to the
general rule that Title VII, as a remedial statute, should be interpreted broadly in
favor of the plaintiff.
A. Foley's Flimsiness
A review of case law suggests that the degree of clarity required by the courts to
overcome the Foley presumption varies considerably with the situation, and that
the presumption is at times easily toppled.12 Many courts have cited Foley and
mentioned its rule, sometimes calling it a "presumption" other times a "canon of
construction,"126 but often not giving it much more than lip service. For instance
only four years after Foley, in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. ,127 the Supreme Court
applied the Lanham Act to acts committed in Mexico, without any "clear" expres-
sion of congressional intent other than a broadened commerce provision. 128
In Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. ,12 the Seventh Circuit neatly
turned the presumption on its head. In trying to determine whether Lebanese citi-
zens could sue other Lebanese citizens for violations of the Commodity Exchange
Act, the court first took note of the presumption, then flipped its application:
Subject matter jurisdiction exists over this dispute only if the anti-fraud provisions of
the Commodity Exchange Act were intended to apply to foreign bro-
kers .... Looking to the language of the statute and its legislative history, we find
no indication, however, that Congress intended to prohibit fraudulent dealings con-
nected with futures trading on domestic exchanges only if the futures transactions
originate in the United States.
130
The Ninth Circuit, in a bankruptcy matter, refused the appellation of "presump-
tion," reducing the Foley rule to something that "is sometimes said," and held that
124. Turley, Trnsnational Discrimination and the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U.L. REv.
339, 392 (1990).
125. For a thorough critique of the presumption, see Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990).
126. Judge Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois gives it no more status than a "notion." Androux v.
Gelderman, Inc., No. 89-C-4447, 1989 WL 27460 (N.D. 11. Mar. 17, 1989). For an example of Judge Shadur's
picturesque prose, see a later opinion in the same case, also unpublished, at Androux v. Gelderman, Inc., No.
89-C-447, 1990 WL 125495 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1990).
127. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
128. Id. at 280. An American corporation was allowed to bring an unfair competition and trademark infringe-
ment suit against another United States citizen for making watches in Mexico and stamping Bulova on them. This
can partially be explained as an "effects" case. See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text. Also, arguably
unfair competition cases should be treated differently from employment situations. See infra note 139 and ac-
companying text. The Boureslan majority rejected the applicability of Steele. Boureslan, Il1 S. Ct. at 1232.
129. 730 F2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984).
130. Id. at 1106. Later, the Tamari court restates the presumption to take into account the territorial effects
exception, which better explains the holding. Id. at 1107 n. 11.
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defendants could be found guilty of fraudulent transfer and concealment of assets
in Canada. 
131
The District Court of Hawaii had its turn in Saipan v. United States Department
of Interior. 132 The issue was whether the government of trust territory in the Pacific
Islands was exempt from judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act
("APA") and immune from the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").
133
The defendants urged the court to apply Foley, arguing NEPA had no language ex-
tending its coverage to the trust territory.1 34 The court responded to this argument
by stating: "I am not persuaded. In my opinion, defendants misconstrue the thrust
of the canon by ignoring the qualifying phrase 'unless a contrary intent ap-
pears.' ",135 The Saipan court pointed out the irony of Foley, which exalted congres-
sional intent to the point of ignoring Congress' express language. 136 Noting that the
Foley Court looked at the Act as a whole, its legislative history, and the administra-
tive interpretation of the Act rather than at the words of the legislators, the Saipan
court did not adopt the "mechanical rule" proposed by the defendants. 137 Instead
the court examined all available evidence of legislative intent before arriving at a
decision.
138
A year earlier, Judge Friendly had taken the same approach in a securities case:
Defendants' reliance on the principle stated in Foley .... that regulatory statutes
will generally not be construed as applying to conduct wholly outside the United
States, is ... misplaced. However, it would be equally erroneous to assume that
the legislature always means to go to the full extent permitted. This is a question of
the interpretation of the particular statute .......
Perhaps the varying strength of the Foley rule turns on the substantive matter
before the court. Arguments have been made that labor statutes are more inher-
ently domestic than others, such as antitrust and securities regulation statutes. If
so, the presumption against extraterritoriality should be particularly strong for la-
bor statutes. 140
131. Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984, 985-89 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 837 (1970).
132. 356 F Supp. 645 (D. Haw. 1973).
133. Saipan, 356 F. Supp. at 648 (citing Administrative Procedure Act §§ 701-706 (1970); National Environ-
mental Policy Act §§ 4321-4361 (1970)).
134. Id. at 649.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 649-50.
137. Id. at 650.
138. Id.
139. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). The court held in
Maxwell that the Securities Act was intended to protect against security fraud whether or not the securities were
traded on United States markets, and regardless of whether the securities were issued by Americans. Id. at
1335-38.
140. See, e.g., Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1984)(citing McCulloch v. So-
ciedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), and Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281
(1949), as evidence of a "general policy against extraterritorial application of labor laws"); Accord Hodgson v.
Union de Permisionarios Circulo Rojo, S. de R.L., 331 F. Supp. 1119 (D.C. Tex. 1971).
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The better view distinguishes among the various labor statutes. Such an argu-
ment was attempted by the plaintiff in Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc. ,141 who
was arguing for extraterritorial application of the ADEA before its amendment:
Plaintiff argues that there is good reason for restricting applicability of the provi-
sions of the FLSA to workers employed in this country: if it were otherwise, wages
required to be paid under the FLSA, where they varied greatly with the prevailing
wage rate in the foreign country, would cause dislocations in the economy of the host
country. Plaintiff contends that a similar threat to a foreign economy does not exist
where our laws prohibiting age discrimination are extended to protect American em-
ployees working abroad. 142
The Cleary court shared plaintiff s policy views, but felt justifiably constrained by
express congressional language of the ADEA precluding extraterritorial applica-
tion. 1
Labor statutes with a civil rights thrust, which are in accord with international
human rights agreements, 14 should not be considered to have the same narrow
domestic scope as more picayune labor regulations. For that reason, despite the
Boureslan majority's heavy reliance on Foley, Foley's specific holding regarding
the Eight Hour Law is not necessarily applicable to Title VII. First, Title VII is not
particularly analogous to the Eight Hour Law, for Title VII is broader in scope and
the effect of its violations abroad is more surely felt in the United States. 14 Also
the absolute wording of the Eight Hour Law might well clash with foreign hour
limitations, whereas most nations of the world have expressed commitment to
non-discriminatory workplaces. " Insofar as an actual conflict of laws might
arise, Title VII provides the flexible defense of the Bona Fide Occupational Quali-
141. 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
142. Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1259 (D.N.J. 1983), affd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir.
1984)(emphasis added).
143. Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 608 (3d Cir. 1984). The ADEA is part of the FLSA,
which at the time Cleary was decided specifically exempted companies operating on foreign soil.
Section 7 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626, provides that "[t]he provisions of this chapter [the ADEA]
shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in section 211 (b),
216 (except for subdivision (a) thereof) and 217 of this title .... "The provisions referenced are part of
the FLSA. Section 16(d), 29 U.S.C. § 216(d), provides that "no employer shall be subject to any liability
or punishment . . . on account of his failure to comply with any provision of such Acts (1) with respect to
work ... performed in a work place to which the exception in section 13(f) of this title is applicable."
Section 13(f), 29 U.S.C. § 213(f), in turn provides that the acts covered by it shall not apply "to any
employee whose services during the workweek are performed in a work place within a foreign coun-
try .....
Cleary, 728 F.2d at 608. The ADEA was later amended expressly to provide for extraterritorial application. All
courts considering the extraterritoriality of the ADEA before amendment agreed that it could not be applied to
acts committed on foreign soil. See, e.g., Lopez v. Pan Am World Serv., 815 F.2d 1118 (11th Cir. 1987);
Zahouric v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279
(4th Cir. 1984). But because of the peculiar statutory scheme of the ADEA, Judge Posner found the statutory
language less unequivocal than the Third, Fourth and Tenth Circuits had. He nonetheless came to the conclusion
that the ADEA should not have extraterritorial reach. Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.
1985).
144. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
146. See infra note 224.
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fication ("BFOQ"), which should preclude head-on collisions of law.147 Also, ad-
ministrative interpretation of Title VII supported extraterritorial jurisdiction and
was contrary to the Court's decision, whereas in Foley the administrators and the
Court were in agreement.
B. A Chorus ofAuthority in Favor of Extraterritorial
Application of Title VII
Other courts, the EEOC, the Justice Department and most scholars did not find
Foley determinative when they addressed the question of whether Title VII applied
to occurrences outside the United States.
1. Case Law
Aramco's treatment of Ali Boureslan resulted in not only the first Supreme
Court statement on the extraterritoriality of Title VII, but also the first circuit
court opinions on the subject. Until then only trial courts had grappled with the
question. Most notably, the New Jersey District Court in Bryant v. International
Schools Services" had allowed extraterritorial application of Title VII, using the
same reasoning proffered by petitioners but rejected by the Supreme Court in
Boureslan,"4' namely: "Congress has the power to extend the reach of its laws to
American citizens outside the geographical boundaries of the United
States ... "' and in drafting Title VII, Congress evidenced that by including the
alien exclusion provision."' The Bryant court cited Love v. Pullman Co. ,152 the
first published case to address the extraterritoriality question, albeit in a footnote.
Although Bryant was overruled on other grounds and the reviewing court did
not affirm its reasoning on extraterritoriality,"5 3 the Bryant court's reasoning re-
garding the extraterritoriality issue had been adopted by the Maryland District
Court. " In Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp.,"' American citizens alleged gender
147.42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 nn.31-66 (1988).
148. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'don other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
149. Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482.
150. Id.
151. Id. The entire logical path turns on the negative implication of the alien exclusion provision. According to
the court, this is what distinguishes Title VII from other labor statutes which have been held not to apply extrater-
ritorially. Id.
152. Id. (citing Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976)).
This discussion assumes that the porters in Montreal were not American citizens. American citizens who
were employed by Pullman in Canada are entitled to full relief without any subtraction. This conclusion
rests on the negative inference of [the alien provision] .. . .Since Congress explicitly excluded aliens
employed outside of any state, it must have intended to provide relief to American citizens employed out-
side of any state in an industry affecting commerce by an employer otherwise covered under the act.
Nothing in the legislative history addresses this specific point, but neither is it contraindicated. Our re-
search has revealed no cases directly in point. An additional support for this interpretation comes from
the international or extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws.
Id. n.4 (citation omitted).
153. Bryant v. International Schools Serv. Inc., 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
154. Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986).
155. Id.
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discrimination against Martin Marietta in Frankfurt, West Germany.' 5 6 The court
allowed the plaintiffs to bring Title VII suits, citing Bryant and Love, and stating
"[t]hese decisions are soundly reasoned and this Court adopts their logic. '"157
Bryant is also in line with dicta and implications in other cases where the reach
of Title VII to acts committed abroad was not questioned."5 ' Until Aramco chal-
lenged Ali Boureslan's claim of subject matter jurisdiction, every judicial body to
look at the matter had decided that Title VII applied to protect United States citi-
zens employed by American companies outside the United States. 
15 9
2. EEOC and Justice Department Interpretations
Until the Supreme Court settled the matter in Boureslan, the EEOC had taken
the position that Title VII could be applied extraterritorially to American corpora-
tions abroad and even to foreign corporations if certain minimum contacts were
found.16 The Justice Department had been on record since 1975 as holding the
same view.
In 1985 the EEOC dealt with sex and national origin discrimination charges
against two American corporations,' 61 designated "Respondent A" and "Respon-
dent B." B's stock was wholly owned by A, which had only one "purely informa-
tional" office in the United States; A's primary facility and work force were
156. Id. at 591-92.
157.Id. at 592.
158. See Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986); Mas Marques v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 637 F.2d 24 (lst Cir. 1980); Kern v. Dynaelectron, 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983); EEOC v. Insti-
tute of Gas Tech., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983). But the Southern District of Ohio
mentioned Love and Bryant with some disapproval in Lavrov v. NCR Corp., 600 F. Supp. 923, 931 (S.D. Ohio
1984), a case which came to the conclusion that Congress had not intended Title VII to apply to employment
practices of foreign corporations outside the United States even if the foreign corporation was the subsidiary of an
American company. The Lavrov court did state that it would "assume for present purposes, that Title VII reaches
extraterritorial discrimination by American employers." Lavrov, 600 F. Supp. at 932 n.6. However, since the
defendants did not raise the question of extraterritorial application in their motion for summary judgment, the
court did not express an opinion regarding it. Id. n.6.
159. Since the Boureslan Fifth Circuit en banc decision has come down, reaction has been mixed. Recently
Akgun v. Boeing, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,011 (W.D. Wash. 1990), allowed American citizens to sue
an American company for alleged discrimination which took place in Turkey. The district court noted that it was
"unpersuaded" by the Boureslan majority of the Fifth Circuit en banc, and adopted Judge King's analyses. Id. On
the other hand, Boureslan was cited without disapproval in Theus v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 738 F. Supp.
1252, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 103 (S.D. Iowa 1990) and EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 53 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Also, while Boureslan was cited with approval in EEOC v. Bermuda
Star Line, 744 F. Supp. 1109, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 836 (M.D. Fla. 1990), it was held not to apply to
the facts of that case.
160. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that because the EEOC has changed its mind on this issue, the EEOC's
interpretation was owed less deference. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. at 1235 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976)). Before 1980 the EEOC's regulations asserted that Title VII "protects all individuals, both citi-
zens and non-citizens, domiciled or residing in" the United States. Id. By negative inference the EEOC was con-
ceding lack of jurisdiction over citizens living abroad. See id. The "domiciled or residing" language was deleted in
1980, and evidently the EEOC began asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 1235-36. Certainly by 1980 the EEOC had
sought and received a subpoena duces tecum in a case involving discrimination in Algeria by a United States com-
pany against a United States citizen. EEOC v. Institute of Gas Technology, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825
(N. D. Ill. 1980); see generally, Kirschner, The Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 34
LAB. L.J. 399 (1983).
161. EEOC Dec. No. 85-16, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6857, at 7070-75 (Sept. 16, 1985).
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located in a foreign country, and its assets were wholly owned by the government
of a foreign country.162 B had offices only in the United States. 
163
Respondent A objected to the court's jurisdiction. 64 A claimed that it was not
"doing business" in the United States and that the allegedly discriminatory prac-
tices involved employment outside the United States.16 A asserted that because
the Act did not have extraterritorial application, the matters complained of fell
outside the coverage of the Act. 1
66
Answering the question of extraterritorial application, the EEOC followed the
Love and Bryant decisions. 167 The EEOC found that Title VII did not exclude from
its jurisdiction the discriminatory practices against United States citizens em-
ployed outside the United States. 168 A "fair interpretation" of the language of the
alien provision leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to protect United
States citizens working abroad. 
169
The EEOC went on to discuss the circumstances under which Title VII applied
to allegedly discriminatory employment practices occurring outside the United
States. 170 The limits of jurisdiction should be determined by the minimum per-
sonal jurisdiction contacts cases like International Shoe Co. v. Washington 1 and
Shaffer v. Heitner. 172 The EEOC examined the "connection" between the United
States and the alleged discrimination, and decided that the mere fact that a United
States citizen made the charge linked the United States to the alleged discrimina-
tion. 17' The EEOC then addressed the factual question of whether the requisite re-
162. Id. at 7071.
163. Id. All of A's employees who were not nationals of A's host country were classified as either "regular" or
.casual" employees; "casual" employees were defined as the wives of regular employees, so, by definition, all
were female. Due to company rules, no casual employees were nationals of the host country. Casual employees
did not have the opportunity to participate in its pension and savings plans, thus leading to the Title VII suit. Id. at
7071.
A pointed to provisions of the host country's law which prohibited employment of dependents of expatriate em-
ployees, and which required that foreign workers not be paid more than nationals performing comparable work
unless necessary to attract the foreign worker. Id. A had negotiated an exception to the first provision, and
thought that the wives should be grateful to it for a chance to work at all. Id. As to A's comments on the second
provision, the EEOC reported:
Since casual employees are already in the country with their spouses and are hired locally-unlike regu-
lar expatriate employees, who are expressly brought into country to work - Respondent A concludes that
incentives paid to regular employees to secure their services in that country are not applicable to casual
employees.
EEOC Dec. No. 85-16, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6857, at 7071 (Sept. 16, 1985).
A's second point may be a poorly articulated defense on the grounds that it was complying with foreign law.
Certainly Congress, in revising Title VII, should make explicit that compliance with foreign law is a complete
defense. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
164. EEOC Dec. No. 85-16, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6857, at 7071 (Sept. 16, 1985).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 7072.
168. Id.
169. EEOC Dec. No. 85-16, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6857, at 7072 (Sept. 16, 1985).
170. Id. at 7073.
171. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
172. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
173. EEOC Dec. No. 85-16, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 16857, at 7073 (Sept. 16, 1985).
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lationship between A and the United States had been established in accordance
with the case-by-case analysis of International Shoe, and found that it had. 1
74
In 1988, the EEOC reiterated its views in a Policy Statement, where it spelled
out its policies on the meshing of employment law and international law.'7 1 Citing
the comments of Congressman Libonati, 178 and the Bryant 77 and Love' 78 deci-
sions, the EEOC wrote that it considered that Title VII did apply extraterritori-
ally. 179 The EEOC statement reveals a far more expansive view of Title VII
jurisdiction than that at issue in Boureslan: the policy statement includes an asser-
tion ofjurisdiction over foreign employers if they do business in the United States
and if the discriminatory act is connected to the United States business. The policy
statement does place some limits on whether United States corporations can be
held accountable under Title VII. The company must not only be incorporated in
the United States,18 but "must also conduct some further business here."181 The




In the eyes of most scholars of both employment law and international law, the
words of Title VII as written express sufficient intent to apply its provisions
abroad.8 I Indeed the reporters to the Restatement approvingly cite Bryant as es-
174. EEOC Dec. No. 85-16, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6857, at 7074 (Sept. 16, 1985). It found these
contacts by looking to: A's American incorporation; its maintenance of an office and an agent for service of pro-
cess here; the funding of its pension plans by American companies; its decision to invoke "the benefits and pro-
tections of the law of the state where Respondent B is located by expressly providing in its agreement with Re-
spondent B that the laws of that state would govern matters pertaining to their contract, including the
extraterritorial acts of the parties in performing the contract;" and its purposeful availment of the privilege of em-
ploying United States citizens by creating Respondent B (which "performs numerous services for Respondent A
in the U.S., including recruiting and training individuals from the United States for employment overseas by A").
Id.
175. EEOC Policy Statement: Application of Title VII to American Companies Overseas and to Foreign Compan-
ies, (BNA) No. 641, at 405:6663 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 EEOC Policy Statement].
176. 110 CONG. REc. 2737 (1964). Congressman Libonati was a member of the Judiciary Committee who
sponsored the bill which became Title VII. EEOC Policy Statement at 405:6663. This evidence is of course un-
dercut by the fact that the Senate deleted the words "foreign commerce" before passing the Act. See supra note 89.
177. Bryant v. International Schools Serv. Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675
F2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
178. Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976).
179. EEOC Policy Statement at 405:6664 n.2.
180. "By incorporating within any state in the United States, a company invokes the benefits, privileges and
protections of U.S. laws and in turn may be subject to those laws, including Title VII." EEOC Policy Statement at
405:6668. The EEOC considered place of incorporation to be only one factor indetermining the nationality of a
company. Id.
181. EEOC Policy Statement at 405:6668.
182. EEOC Policy Statement at 405:6664. See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
183. Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MIcH. L.
REv. 1315, 1320 n.27 (1981); Street, Application of U. S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Employers in
the United States and Abroad, 19 INT'L LAW. & POE. 357 (1987); Note, Title VII of the CiviI RightsAct of 1964 and
the Multinational Enterprise, 73 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1497 (1985) ("Title VII may be applied to extraterritorial em-
ployment discrimination only to the extent that such application conforms with established principles of interna-
tional jurisdiction."); Note, Equal Employment Opportunity for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1288
(1987).
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tablished authority.'8 One casenote author considered the matter settled: "Al-
though not yet explicitly ruled on by the United States Supreme Court, this
conclusion, that United States citizens working abroad are covered by United
States anti-discrimination laws, has been implicitly reached by several federal
courts and no longer seems to be an issue in current cases."
18 5
Most commentators have criticized the majority opinions of the Fifth Circuit in
Boureslan, the opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court. 186 Those agreeing with
the majority have nonetheless recommended congressional action.187
C. Exceptions to the Foley Rue
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations, Section 38, articulated the Fo-
ley rule as follows: "Rules of United States statutory law, whether prescribed by
federal or state authority, apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect
within, the territory of the United States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated
by the statute." 188 This is quite a strong statement of the presumption, close to a
clear expression rule. But an exception to the rule leaps out at the reader of this
section. By its own terms, the presumption may not be applicable to the situation
presented by Boureslan. If Aramco's alleged acts had sufficient effects within the
territory of the United States, petitioners were not really seeking extraterritorial
application of Title VII. Or if it could be proven that Aramco entered into a con-
spiracy in the United States to violate Mr. Boureslan's Title VII rights, or if Mr.
Boureslan was sent to Saudi Arabia for the express purpose of avoiding Title VII
jurisdiction, Title VII should apply.
1. Territorial Effects Exception
In Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,189 complicated interna-
tional jurisdictional matters were raised in an antitrust suit brought by Freddy
Laker against various airlines. '90 The court pointed out:
In the context of remedial legislation, prohibition of effects is usually indivisible
from regulation of causes. Consequently, the principles underlying territorial juris-
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 721 reporter's note 13 (1987).
185. Note, United States Corporations Operating in Saudi Arabia and Laws Affecting Discrimination in Employ-
ment: Which Law ShallPrevail?, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L&COMP. L.J. 135, 138(1985).
186. Strickler, Employment Discrimination, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 231,244-48(1990) ("Judge King has by far
the better of this argument."); Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of Ertraterritorial Regula-
tion, 70 B.U.L. REv. 339 (1990); Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 598 (1990); Note, Jurisdiction - Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Statute
Proscribing Employment Discrimination-Congressional Intent: Boureslan v. Aramco, 83 AM. J. INT'L LAW 375
(1989); Comment, Boureslan v. Aramco Equal Employment Opportunity for U.S. Citizens Abroad, 12 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 564 (1989).
187. Note, Hands Across the Water: Should Title VII of the Ci vil Rights Act of 1964 Have Extraterritorial Applica-
tion ?, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 125 (1989); Note, Same Boss, Different Rules: An Argumentfor Extraterritorial Eten-
sion of TtLe VII to Protect U. S. Citizens Employed Abroad by U. S. Multinational Corporations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
479(1990).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 38 (1965).
189. 731 F2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
190. Id.
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diction occasionally permit a state to address conduct causing harmful effects across
national borders . . . . [Clonduct outside the territorial boundary which has or is
intended to have a substantial effect within the territory may also be regulated by the
state. 191
This ability to regulate extraterritorial conduct producing effects within the ter-
ritory has been available throughout this century, and has been most recently
enunciated in Section 402(1)(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations:
Subject to § 403 [prescribing the limits of "reasonable" exercise ofjurisdiction], a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial ef-
fect within its territory.
192
191. Id. at 921-22.
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(l)(c) (1986). In Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S.
280 (1911), Justice Holmes wrote:
If a jury should believe the evidence and find that Daily did the acts .... the usage of the civilized
world would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although he never had set foot in the State until after the
fraud was complete. Acts done outside ajurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the causes of the harm as if he had been present at the effect,
if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.
Daily, 221 U.S. at 284-85.
"The traditional example of this principle is that of the transnational homicide: when a malefactor in State A
shoots a victim across the border in State B, State B can proscribe the harmful conduct." LakerAirlines, 731 F.2d
at 922.
See also Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, 600 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affd,
245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958)("[I]nherent in national sovereignty is the power
to impose, even upon foreigners owing no allegiance, liability for acts done abroad which proximately cause
damage within the territorial limits of the sovereign."); Accord United States v. Muench, 694 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908 (1983).
This doctrine is reflected in both the Second and Third Restatements of Foreign Relations. The differences be-
tween the Restatements is discussed in National Transp. Safety Bd. v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 723 F. Supp.
1488, 1490-91 (S.D. Fla. 1989), a case involving the enforcement of subpoenas in an investigation of a marine
accident:
According to the most recent Restatement, the "effects doctrine" provides jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to conduct outside the territory of a state if the conduct has a "substantial effect within its
territory," and the exercise of such jurisdiction is not "unreasonable." However, the previous Restate-
ment, which was widely accepted, imposed a more stringent standard for the exercise of jurisdiction
based upon the "effects doctrine." According to the Second Restatement, a state may only exercise juris-
diction on this basis when the conduct that occurs outside its territory causes an effect within its territory
that is "substantial," and "occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside its territory."
Pursuant to either of these standards, however, it appears that Congress may indeed have jurisdiction to
prescribe law authorizing investigations of accidents in circumstances such as this.
Id. (citations omitted); Accord Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 558; see also Note, Age Discrimination -Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act-Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Determines
That a United States Corporation Operating in West Germany Is Subject to Suit Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act-Employers Defense Based on Compliance with West German Law Rejected, 20 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 207, 212-13 (1990).
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This effects doctrine cannot overcome express congressional language,193 but the
LakerAirlines court wrote: "The territorial effects doctrine is not an extraterritor-
ial assertion of jurisdiction . . . . The only extraterritoriality about the transac-
tions reached under the territorial effects doctrine is that not all of the causative
factors producing the proscribed result may have occurred within the territory."194
The court exercised jurisdiction because of the effect on American citizen con-
sumers, the users of airlines.
Various courts agree with the assertion that reliance on the Foley presumption
is misplaced "when conduct outside the United States could otherwise affect do-
mestic conditions." 9 ' Judge Bork, when deciding whether an American account-
ing firm could be held for securities law violations in an audit report prepared for
West German investors, framed the issue as: "American court jurisdiction over
securities law claims against a defendant who acted in the United States when the
securities transaction occurred abroad and there was no effect felt in this coun-
try. ,,196 Other courts use effects findings as part of their analysis of congressional
intent. 197
Justice Douglas, in his dissent to Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 9 revealed
that some version of the effects argument had been considered by that Court. The
Boureslan majority relied on McCulloch, which in turn was dependent on the Benz
analysis determining that the NLRA did not apply to foreign flag ships.' 99 Justice
Douglas argued that because foreign crew members were paid about one-third of
the amount of American cash wages, and because foreign ships were in competi-
tion with American vessels, "[t]his case involves a contest between American un-
193. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989)(finding that the alien tort
statute did not apply against the Argentine Republic even though the alleged tort may have had effects in the
United States because of specific statutory language); see also Empresa Hondurena de Vapores v. McLeod, 300
F.2d 222,236 (2d Cir. 1962)(holding that despite the possibility of labor tensions on Honduran vessels in United
States water would lead to American labor troubles, "that scarcely is decisive- the question still is how far Con-
gress intended to permit the Board to intervene in what would normally be the affairs of a foreign government in
order to prevent [American labor troubles]." This case was decided on writ of certiorari as McCulloch v. So-
ciedad Nacional de Morineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1962)), discussed supra at note 93.
194. LakerAirlines, 731 F.2d at 923.
195. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F2d 1103, 1107 n. 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
871 (1984); see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), concerning application of the Securities Act to sales of
securities in Canada between foreign buyers and sellers, where the court stated:
In our view, neither the usual presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation nor the spe-
cific language of Section 30 (b) show Congressional intent to preclude application of the Exchange Act to
transactions regarding stocks traded in the United States which are effected outside the United States,
when extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors.
Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
196. Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(emphasis added).
197. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952)("operations and their effects were not
confined within the territorial limits of a foreign nation" thus, the Court held that the Lanham Act may be applied
to wrongful use of the Bulova trademark in Mexico); Stegeman v. United States, 425 F2d 984,985-86 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 837 (1970); See also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1980): Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Tamari v. Bache Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103
(7th Cir. 1984). But see Zahourek v. Arthur Young and Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1984).
198. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
199. Boureslan, 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). See also supra note 94.
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ions and a foreign ship . . . .American unions, therefore, have a vital interest in
the working conditions and wages of the seamen aboard this foreign vessel."200
Thus, as often happens, the thorough argument of a dissenting justice strengthens
and even broadens the effect of the decision the judge is dissenting from, by pre-
cluding distinguishing arguments.
No man is an island unto himself, especially in an increasingly global economy.
Acts done in one country very often, even usually, produce some ripple effects in
another country. A strong argument could be made that wherever it occurs in the
world, wrongful discrimination against a United States citizen by an American
company causes harmful effects within the territory of the United States. It is the
unemployment statistics, the welfare rolls, and the employment climate of the
United States which will be affected, rather than those of the host country. More
specifically, members of the same protected class as the victim will be chilled in
their desire to work for the company or to accept overseas stints. In many compan-
ies sojourns abroad are required for meaningful advancement. Failure to correct
the Boureslan holding could result in a significant barrier to the advancement of
the protected classes -the kind of barrier that Title VII was created to break
down. 201
Carried to the extreme, liberal application of the effects rule could lead to uni-
versal application of United States laws. United States courts, not yet ready for
"One World," are hesitant to apply the effects doctrine to find jurisdiction over acts
consummated abroad. The reasons they give for their reluctance to assert jurisdic-
tion often return to Foley and its assumption that normally Congress has a domes-
tic intent when it enacts most laws.202 United States courts also fear a clashing of
laws .203 Thus, while many courts acknowledge the existence of the effects doc-
trine, few find jurisdiction after applying the rule. Nonetheless this doctrine is
200. 353 U.S. at 147 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
201. Again, the wording and legislative history of Title VII and civil rights laws are significantly different from
those of other labor laws. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
202. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30-31 (Judge Bork, favoring restrictive approach to assuming jurisdiction).
203. See, e.g., Empresa Hondurena, 300 F.2d at 223-26. Judge Friendly considered whether the NLRB had
the power to order a representation election on ships regulated by Honduran law, owned by a Honduran corpora-
tion, employing Honduran crews under a contract with a Honduran union. The ships regularly visited Honduras.
Some ties to America existed. The Honduran corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary of a United States cor-
poration, its officers were elected by its directors who were elected by the American parent and the vessels were
engaged in the foreign commerce of the United States. He recognized that controversy over this commercial ship
could lead to strike, and "burden or obstruct commerce," which is precisely what the NLRA was drafted to avoid.
Id. at 236. "Last summer's strike of the American merchant marine, with which we have some familiarity
...sufficiently demonstrates this." id. (citation omitted). But, he concluded:
However, that scarcely is decisive- the question still is how far Congress intended to permit the Board to
intervene in what would normally be the affairs of a foreign government in order to prevent this. Even if
we were to make the unrealistic assumption that Congress was so far-seeing as not only to have contem-
plated the growth of flags of convenience when it adopted the Labor Act in 1935, but also to have antici-
pated cases where an American company would operate some ships under our own flag and others
through foreign subsidiaries flying the flags of other countries, we see no basis fbr believing Congress
would have chosen to solve the problem by an exercise of jurisdiction which would create such a conflict
with a foreign government as would seem inevitable here.
Id. Thus again the fear of conflict of laws affects the question of whether American laws apply to offshore viola-
tions.
[Vol. 11:271
A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT
perhaps the most valid reason for finding that Title VII, remedial legislation in-
tended to correct employment discrimination, should proscribe acts committed by
Americans against Americans overseas.
2. Fraud Exception
Another exception to the general rule presuming only territorial application of
United States laws is explained by Judge Posner in Pfeiffer v. Wn. Wrigley Jr. Co. 204
All this is not to say, however, that if Pfeiffer had worked for Wrigley in the United
States, and Wrigley to get around the Age Discrimination in Employment Act had
moved him abroad in his last day (or week, or month - we need not explore the outer
bounds of the limiting principle sketched here) and then fired him, it would be im-
mune from liability under the Act. In that hypothetical case Pfeiffer's relevant work
station would be (we may assume, without having to decide) the United States. This
much flexibility the Act may have.2"5
Some years earlier the Fifth Circuit had made the same point, writing in United
States v. Mitchell:2 6
[Some laws] are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction
would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a
large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in
foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to
make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and for-
eign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.207
Under the Mitchell analysis, the presumption does not even arise if the law is of
such a nature that its extraterritorial application is mandated. 0 8 This analysis
could have been applied to Title VII. If one rung on the corporate ladder is the
foreign stint, and if the purpose of Title VII is to ensure fair treatment at work,
including on the corporate ladder, is not jurisdiction over the foreign rung man-
dated? Certainly when facts are present to support an allegation of intentional eva-
sion of the scope of the statute, argument could be made that the nature of Title
VII is such that if it is not given extraterritorial application, a fraud will be perpe-
trated on the court or on the legislature, because the purpose of the law will be
frustrated.2 09
204. 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
205. Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559.
206. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
207. Id. at 1002.
208. Id. The Mitchell court found that the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 was not of such a nature that
its extraterritorial application was mandated, at which point the Foley presumption arose. The court found that
conservation statutes are of a territorial nature, as was "indicated by the conflict of national interests that is cre-
ated by the attempt of one state to regulate resource development in another state." Id. at 1003 n. 13.
209. See also Stegeman, 425 F.2d at 984.
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3. Conspiracy Exception
Closely related to the fraud exception is the situation where plaintiff asserts that
the discriminatory act actually occurred in the United States. The act, for these
purposes, might be giving the order to discharge, demote, or harass,210 or entering
into a conspiracy originating within the United States.2 This is not a successful
exception if the statutory language expressly forbids jurisdiction abroad, as did the
pre-amendment ADEA,2 2 but is valid, if the facts permit, in Title VII cases.
D. A Better Approach to the Question of Extraterritoriality
The Foley presumption is weak and crippled with exceptions. It is regrettable
that the majority opinion has given greater strength to the presumption than it had
at its birth, for in fact the presumption is too blunt to handle the intricacies of a
determination regarding whether a statute should be applied to acts overseas. Me-
chanical application of the presumption is like using an axe where a scalpel is re-
quired.
Several jurists, like Judge King of the Fifth Circuit, have appreciated that the
question is too complex to be "solved" by the rote application of a tired presump-
tion.213 They have recognized the polycentric nature of the analysis. Perhaps the
most comprehensive statement of how courts should go about determining
whether a statute should be applied extraterritorially comes from Air Line Stew-
210. See, e.g., Zahourek, 750 F.2d at 829; Cleary, 728 F.2d at 610.
211. Cf United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (Sherman and Wilson Acts).
212. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 610 n.6 (3d Cir. 1984).
Finally, appellant argues that the decision to discharge him was made in New York, not in London, and
that therefore his cause of action does not depend on the extraterritorial application of the ADEA. The
language of section 213(f), however, looks to the place of employment, not the place where the decision
was made. Unless we are to accept one of appellants [sic] arguments that section 213(0 does not apply,
this argument is irrelevant.
Id.
213. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024. Judge King correctly noted, in her dissent from the Boureslan panel deci-
sion: "In order to evaluate the complex issues raised in this case, we need a finer set of analytic tools than those
employed in the majority opinion." Id.
In addition to rightly chastising the majority for handling the issue too rigidly and applying the "presumption"
too mechanically, Judge King also considered that the majority had oversimplified the question. She suggested an
alternative framework: the analysis should turn on the reasonableness of the exercise ofjurisdiction. Id. at 1025.
She began with the Restatement § 403(1) which provides: "A state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe
law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion is unreasonable." Id. at 1024 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(l)(1987)).
Reasonableness, she continued, is to be considered in view of various factors set out in § 403(2). Id. If the exer-
cise is unreasonable, then the majority's requirement of affirmative statement of congressional intent would be
valid. If it is reasonable, "no express statement of Congress is required to overcome the presumption." Boureslan,
857 F.2d at 1024.
To restate, under Judge King's analysis, the first question is whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.
The answer to this question determines the level of expressness of the congressional intent. The second question
is then whether the expression of congressional intent rises to the appropriate level.
Applying this to Title VII, she found that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable, hence "express intent"
need not be found. Judge King's approach is somewhat convoluted, and includes confusing use of § 403. That
section's reasonableness test goes expressly to the power of the state to regulate, which is undisputed in Boureslan,
rather than to whether or not the state in fact did seek to regulate conduct abroad when drafting Title VII.
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ards v. Trans WorldAirlines,214 in which the District Court of the Southern District
of New York recognized that extraterritoriality is an ad hoc determination based
on various competing concerns. The court stated:
The teaching of the Supreme Court decisions just considered is that, in resolving the
question whether a particular federal statute is to be construed as possessing extra-
territorial effect, the following factors must be evaluated: (1) whether the statutory
language is vague or explicit as to the reach of the statute; (2) whether the statutory
policies underlying the legislation were deliberately and consciously shaped with the
existence or peculiarities of the foreign area in mind; (3) whether the legislative his-
tory of the statute evinces any specific congressional intention with respect to the
subject of extra-territoriality; (4) whether the vindication of the public policy to be
subserved requires extra-territorial operation; (5) whether the extra-territoriality of
the statute is necessary for the effective regulation of the action of our citizens; (6)
whether the defendant's acts were a device to evade the thrust of the statute by at-
tempting to create a privileged sanctuary beyond our borders; (7) whether the legis-
lation is a criminal statute or requires the upholding of the sovereign power of the
United States; (8) whether the extra-territorial trade practices radiate unlawful con-
sequences here notwithstanding that they were initiated or consummated outside the
United States; (9) whether a substantial number of American citizens are within the
extra-territorial area sought to be regulated; (10) whether the extra-territorial acts
sought to be regulated occur on a geographical area over which the United States has
some measure of territorial or legislative control, although the area is not within the
sovereignty of the United States; (11) whether the same policies suited to the United
States are adaptable to the local conditions of the foreign area; (12) whether the de-
fendant's particular operations and their effects were confined within the territorial
limits of a foreign nation; (13) whether the rights of other nations or their nationals
may be infringed; (14) whether the alleged violation of the statute is grounded on a
foreign nation's sovereign acts; (15) whether the extra-territorial operation of the
statute would impugn foreign law or tend to interfere with the sovereignty, institu-
tions, social conditions or commercial practices of another nation; and (16) whether
the defendants or other persons whose conduct is to be directly affected are Ameri-
can citizens or foreign nationals, or residents of the United States or some other
country. 215
While this is the most complete statement of case law, other courts have
adopted a similarly multi-faceted, although more concise, approach. In Stegeman
v. United States,216 the Ninth Circuit determined that a law forbidding fraudulent
concealment in a bankruptcy matter could apply to conduct occurring in Can-
ada.2 17 It articulated a mild version of the Foley presumption, but also wrote of the
214. Air Line Stewards v. Trans World Airlines, 173 F. Supp. 369,377-78 (S.D.N .Y.), ajffd, 273 F.2d 69 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960).
215. Id. at 377-78. The court went on to find that the National Mediation Board's jurisdiction under the RLA
did not apply to employees on planes flying solely outside the continental United States and its possessions. Air
Line Stewards, 173 F. Supp. at 378-79.
216. 425 F.2d at 984.
217. Id. at 986.
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need for the government to protect its own interests . 2 18 It pointed out that the stat-
ute contained no place limitation, and was "capable of perpetration without regard
to locality. '219 It noted that the effects of the violation of the statute would "be felt
principally within the U.S.," and concluded that "to exclude concealments by
debtors outside the U.S. . . . would frustrate the statute's purpose by creating an
obvious and readily available means of evasion."220
Similarly Judge Bork, in determining that United States securities laws did not
apply to an audit report prepared for a German company, looked to where the ef-
fects of the violation would be felt, and whether acts done in the United States "di-
rectly caused" the losses suffered by the foreigners, then cited Foley and legislative
history establishing the domestic intent of Congress in enacting the securities
laws.221 If the majority of the Boureslan justices had taken this less rigid, more
multi-faceted approach, not only could they have given greater weight to the legis-
lative history and to the EEOC's interpretation, but also they could have taken into
account international accords and the fundamental policies behind Title VII.
Yet another canon of statutory construction holds that a statute should not be
construed to violate international law unless Congress has affirmatively indicated
an intent to do so. 222 Certainly no international law requires extraterritorial appli-
cation of one sovereign's laws. But when the governments of many foreign nations
have joined with the United States in exalting of equality of employment opportu-
nity and decrying employment discrimination, it is ironic that our Supreme Court
is hesitant to protect our own citizens from discrimination by our own citizens,
merely because the discrimination occurred on foreign soil, particularly when the
foreign nation is a signatory to some of these accords.223
As a member of the United Nations, this country has pledged to promote and
encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free-
dom of employment opportunity for all races, genders, and religions .224 Most na-
218. Id. at 985-86 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (finding criminal jurisdiction over a
securities fraud conspiracy hatched aboard a ship voyaging from America to Brazil)).
219. Id. at 986.
220. Id.
221. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 27.
222. Rossi v. Weinberger, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21-22; Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023
(King, I., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 15 comment a (1962).
223. Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the ILO Convention.
224. U.N. CHARTER art. I para. 3; id. arts. 55-56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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tions of the world have agreed to similar pledges.22 Any action, including
applying Title VII extraterritorially, which reduces invidious discrimination on
the grounds of race, color, religion or gender would seem to be in keeping with
these accords.226 The existence of these international agreements argues for appli-
cation of a statute designed to further these same goals, especially ii the alleged
violation occurs within the borders of a co-signatory to these agreements. Other
countries will be less likely to institute diplomatic protests over extraterritorial ap-
plication of our law when they have agreed to the goals furthered by our law;
therefore foreign reaction to our offshore application of antitrust laws is not a good
indicator of reaction to application of Title VII abroad.227
Domestic policy, like international policy, deserves consideration when an-
swering the close question of extraterritoriality. It is revealing that when the
majority wrote of the equal plausibility of each side's positions, it let itself be
swayed by a rickety eighty-year-old presumption rather than by the well-known
goals of Title VII. Title VII was written to protect the right of African-Americans
to first class citizenship, specifically by ensuring their rights to employment.228
The primary impetus for the act was fear of domestic unrest, but some legislators
also voiced concern about America's image in the world .221 The rhetoric of Presi-
dent Kennedy added to the impetus: "In this year of the emancipation centennial,
225. International Labor Organization Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation, opened for signature June 25, 1958, 362 U. N. T. S. 31; International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1965); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53,
55-56, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542, U.N.
GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); International Convention on the Suppres-
sion and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75,
U.N. Doc. A/9233/Add. 1 (1973); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); Dec-
laration on the Promotion Among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding Between Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 2037, U.N. GAOR 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1952); Convention
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, ILO Convention, No. 111.
226. Requiring United States companies to comply with Title VII abroad would be in pleasing symmetry with
rulings that foreign employers on United States soil must comply with Title VII, despite treaty language arguably
to the contrary. See MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349
(1989).
227. See Note, Age Discrimination -Extraterritorial Application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act-
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Determines That a United States Corporation Operating in West Ger-
many Is Subject to Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act-Employer's Defense Based on
Complionce with West German Law Rejected, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 207, 217 (1990)(citing J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 102-05 (2d ed. 1981)).
228. Legislators wrote of the 1964 Civil Rights Act:
In other titles of this bill we have endeavored to protect the Negro's right to first-class citizenship.
Through voting, education, equal protection of the laws, and free access to places of public accommoda-
tions, means have been fashioned to eliminate racial discrimination.
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty stomach. The impetus to achieve
excellence in education is lacking if gainful employment is closed to the graduate. The opportunity to en-
ter a restaurant or hotel is a shallow victory where one's pockets are empty. The principle of equal treat-
ment under law can have little meaning if in practice its benefits are denied the citizen.
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2513.
229. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027-28 (King, J., dissenting).
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justice requires us to insure the blessing of liberty for all Americans and their pos-
terity -not merely for reasons of economic efficiency, world diplomacy, and domes-
tic tranquility -but, above all, because it is right. "230
Judge King used this quotation to argue that extraterritoriality was contem-
plated at the time of passage of Title VII. Even if the quotation does not go that far,
it obviously indicates a global view. Perhaps the United States citizen who volun-
tarily expatriates himself, leaving American soil, then comes crying to the Ameri-
can courts when his toes are stepped on does not generate much sympathy. But the
spectre of someone dutifully doing a foreign tour in order to advance in an Ameri-
can corporation, then being subjected to treatment that would be illegal on Ameri-
can soil, is certainly anathema to the vision of those who drafted Title VII in order
to protect the minority's right to full employment.
One of the goals of Title VII was to change people's thinking, to change the em-
ployment climate for people of color. Courts interpreting Title VII consistently
with our international commitment to full human rights have shown no reluctance
to impose American anti-discrimination point of view on other countries, and to
force American companies operating abroad to conform with American law in the
face of the realities of international business practice. In Fernandez v. f4nn Oil
Co. ,231 the Ninth Circuit rejected a district court finding that masculine gender
was a BFOQ2 32 for a position which required dealing with Latin American clients
who "would react negatively to a woman vice-president .. 233 The circuit
panel noted a lack of proof that hiring a woman in the position would" 'destroy the
essence' of Wynn's business or 'create serious safety and efficacy problems.' 234
The panel went on to state that as a matter of law customer preferences or "the need
to accommodate racially discriminatory policies of other nations cannot be the ba-
sis of a valid BFOQ .... ,,23' Although the panel declared that it was not impos-
ing American standards of non-discrimination on other nations ,236 it clearly was
doing two things: forcing non-American businessmen to "get used to" females in
business, and forcing American businesses to compete in an international market
with what at least the company perceived as a handicap. Fernandez is consistent
230. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1026 (King, J., dissenting).
231. 653 F2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
232. See supra notes 115 and 147.
233. Id. at 1274.
234. Id. at 1276.
235. Id. at 1276-77. The decision of the district court was nonetheless upheld because the plaintiff had not
proven that she was qualified for the position.
236. Wynn attempts to distinguish Diaz [holding that customer preference based on sexual stereotype cannot
justify discriminatory conduct] by asserting that a separate rule applies in international contexts. Such a distinc-
tion is unfounded. Though the United States cannot impose standards of non-discriminatory conduct on other
nations through its legal system, the district court's rule would allow other nations to dictate discrimination in this
country. No foreign nation can compel the non-enforcement of Title VII here.
Id. at 1277.
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with the general rule that customer preference is not a defense, which furthers the
far-reaching goals of Title VII.237
If the Boureslan majority had been willing to take a broader approach to the
question of extraterritoriality, rather than relying on Foley's weak canon, it could
have considered the domestic effect of violations of the Title, the full legislative
history, the international climate and the overall goals of the Act. The Boureslan
majority might have prevented a fundamental unfairness, best caught by the title
of a law review note: "Same Boss, Different Rules."238
E. The Theory of Broad Application of Title VII
Boureslan also runs counter to the general rule in the circuits that Title VIIjuris-
diction is to be liberally construed. In Quijano v. University Federal Credit Un-
ion,2"9 the Fifth Circuit struggled with the question of whether a credit union fell
within the exemption to Title VII for "bona-fide private membership clubs."240
The court began:
The proposition which guides our analysis of this question is that "Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to be accorded a liberal construction in order to carry out
the purposes of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation
of racial discrimination." The statute's definition of "employer" is entitled to similar
liberal construction.241
In concluding that the credit union was not exempt, the court noted "Congress' ef-
fort to eliminate the affects [sic] of discrimination in almost every facet of society
"242
It is ironic that it was the Fifth Circuit which decided against Mr. Boureslan, for
that very circuit has not been hesitant to give liberal construction to Title VII's
provisions, and has been home to various expansive opinions. Jurisdictional pre-
237. A holding similar both in its substance and in its silence regarding its full ramifications has been made by
the EEOC. CCH EEOC Decisions (1973) 1 6317.
238. Note, Same Boss, Different Rules: An Argument for Extraterritorial Extension of Title VII to Protect U.S.
Citizens Employed Abroad by U.S. Multinational Corporations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990).
239. 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980).
240. Id. at 130 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2)(1988)).
241. Quijano, 617 F.2d at 131 (quoting Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir.
1970)). The membership club exception has generally been narrowly construed. See generally B. SCHLE1 & P.
GRossMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIscIMINATION LAW 1007 (BNA 2d ed. 1983), and cases cited therein.
242. Quijano, 617 F.2dat 133.
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requisites to Title VII claims have been equitably modified, 2" the right-to-sue let-
ter prerequisite has been broadly construed, 2" a private plaintiff has been allowed
to bring suit even though the EEOC had already brought a suit on her behalf which
had been dismissed, 245 and particularly broad discovery expeditions have been al-
lowed.246 Similar holdings can be found in other jurisdictions.247
In particular this liberal construction rule has been used to allow expansive def-
initions of a Title VII "employer. ''2' The term has been given an international
243. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Reeb v.
Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975); and further discussion in Chappell v. Emco
Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520,
527 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1980), and cases cited therein.
Judge Wisdom is one of the prime movers toward equitable interpretation of jurisdictional prerequisites. For an
earlier case with a similar result, see Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding
that filing period should be tolled while the employee is invoking contractual grievance remedies). See generally
Note, Title VII- Time Limitation for Filing Charge with EEOC is Subject to Equitable Tolling, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 614 (1980), noting the dispute among the circuits in this point. For cases declining to tol the period, see
Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1337-39 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979); Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601
F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1979); Bickham v. Miller, 584 F.2d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Sanchez v.
Standard Brands, 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970) (reversal of lower court's decision to dismiss complaint because
plaintiff had written the wrong words and checked the wrong box in filing out an administrative charge form
supplied by the EEOC); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).
244. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 402-06 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S.
747 (1976).
245. Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F2d 520 (5th Cir. 1980). The EEOC's suit had been dismissed
for failure to comply with jurisdictional preconditions. "Put simply, it would be anomalous to deny a person the
right to bring her own action, when the EEOC could have started over, conducted a good faith investigation, is-
sued a reasonable cause finding and brought a second action on the same claim." Id. at 527.
246. Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC, 444 F.2d 1335, 1339 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971).
As we noted in Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1970), courts confronted
with procedural ambiguities in the statutory framework have, with virtual unanimity, resolved them in
favor of the complaining party. It has been held, for example, that a class action can be maintained under
the Act even though only one member of the class has filed a charge of discrimination. Miller v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1968). In addition, courts have held that the statutory requirement that a charge of discrimination be "un-
der oath" can be satisfied by verification after the expiration of the ninety-day period. Blue Bell Boots,
Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
Id. See also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972)(plaintiff charged that employer, an optometrist, had
created a work environment "heavily charged with discrimination" by segregating employer's optometry pa-
tients; EEOC therefore entitled to broad discovery to determine whether evidence existed of a discriminatory
employment practice proscribed by Title VII).
247. E.g., Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways Inc., 460
F.2d 258,260 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 912 (1972).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1988). See Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226,227 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding immediate
supervisors to be "employers" when they can hire and fire); Williams v. City of Montgomery, 742 F.2d 586, 589
(11 th Cir. 1984) (holding that city and city-county personnel board and its members who were in charge of hiring
and firing members of the city's Fire Department were liable as "employers" by virtue of the agency relationship);
Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that "broadcasting companies shar[ing]
management and ownership and operations were sufficiently interrelated so that companies could be consoli-
dated as 'employers' forjurisdictional purposes of Title VII . . . . "); Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (male private duty nurse allowed to bring action against hospital which did not employ him
but which ran a nurse registry and referral system); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp.
1089 (D.N.H. 1974) (holding State Racing Commission and state trotting and breeding association "employers"
because they controlled licensing of, and stall space for, driver-trainers of harness horses).
[Vol. 11:271
A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT
reach. In Ward v. W & H Voortman,249 the court denied a Canadian defendant em-
ployer's motion to dismiss.2' The defendant had asserted that Title VII did not ap-
ply to a foreign corporation."' In deciding that Title VII applied to the Canadian
employer, the court found persuasive the Quijano decision and other cases requir-
ing broad application of Title VII. 252
V. A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
An unknown number of United States citizens will be affected by the determi-
nation that Title VII does not protect them from employment discrimination com-
mitted off American soil but by American companies. Statistics regarding the
number of United States citizens working for United States companies abroad have
proven elusive, for they are not compiled with regularity by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.25 But even if it were available, this number would underestimate how
many Americans are affected by Boureslan. Removing Title VII protection from
overseas branches will have an impact not only on those employed overseas but
also on any worker who perceives that she or he "can't go" to a certain branch or
who elects not to go abroad out of fear of unchecked discrimination. By winking at
employment discrimination in any way, the Court increases the number of Ameri-
cans who become discouraged before they try. Many of the benefits of our civil
rights laws are reaped through changed perceptions, both on the part of potential
victims (that someone is watching out for them) and potential oppressors (that
someone is watching them). Civil libertarians grieve the Boureslan outcome be-
cause it appears to give American companies free rein to do whatever they please
abroad. Neal Paster, the Houston attorney representing Mr. Boureslan, stated the
249. 685 F Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988). The court noted that Congress had not exempted foreign employers,
although it had exempted other employers. Id.
Moreover, by exempting employment of aliens abroad, Congress apparently intended to avoid possible
conflicts between American law and foreign law. If Congress had intended, out of a similar concern for
fbreign relations, to draw as important a distinction as one between domestic and foreign employers do-





252. 685 F. Supp. at 232.
253. The New York Times blithely asserts, without citation, that Boureslan leaves "hundreds of thousands" of
Americans with protection. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1991, at A16, col. 3. The New York Times also reported on
Jan. 5, 1988 that 35,000 to 40,000 Americans lived in Saudi Arabia alone. According to the Benchmark Survey
of United States Direct Investment Abroad compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Depart-
ment of Commerce in 1982, 41,000 United States citizens were then employed by majority-owned foreign affili-
ates of United States companies. Of course Boureslan would probably not be applicable to them since the
affiliates would presumably not be American companies. For a discussion of the difficulty of finding statistics,
and estimates that about two million Americans live abroad, see Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the
Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U.L. REv. 339, 389-90 n.289 (1990).
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practical result of the decision as: " 'If a company wants to get rid of an employee,
all it has to do is transfer him overseas and then fire him.' "2s54
The concern of American businesses that they will be subjected to weak or ut-
terly unfounded suits has been growing and has received political recognition in
recent years.25s Boureslan's holding that the EEOC has no jurisdiction over acts
occurring overseas provides employers an escape hatch; will "difficult cases" or
"problem people" now be sent out of the country to be dealt with?
The Boureslan result may also provide added impetus for American companies
to move their offices abroad. For years American workers have had to compete
with cheaper foreign labor. Now American workers at all levels who choose to stay
in their homeland must compete with those Americans who are willing to sacrifice
their civil rights and go abroad. Further, companies with the resources to open for-
eign branches will have an unfair advantage over stay-at-home American busi-
nesses since they will have a lowered threat of lawsuits hanging over their heads.
This means, if nothing else, a smaller legal staff and less paperwork.
Particularly disturbing is the fact that in many corporate enterprises the path to
advancement includes a stint overseas. Now employees are forced into an unpro-
tected interlude if they seek to rise to the top. Again, the chilling effect of such a
requirement must be considered when assessing the damage resulting from the
Boureslan finding.
Coke has written, "[F]oreign employment is a kind of honorable banish-
ment." It need not be so. Employment on foreign soil ought not to be a step out-
side of the protective umbrella of Title VII. It is regrettable that the majority of the
Supreme Court chose to use Boureslan as a vehicle to rejuvenate the overly-facile
Foley presumption, and in so doing shorten the protective reach of Title VII, a stat-
ute designed to remedy civil rights violations. Congress shares some of the blame
for its lack of precision in drafting Title VII and the new ADA. This is lamentable
and must be corrected. Any piece of legislation, particularly a broad-sweeping
federal remedial statute, should expressly state where and to whom it applies. As
the Boureslan majority points out, Congress does know how to make a statute ap-
ply extraterritorially.5 7 In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist invited Congress to amend
Title VII to make its extraterritorial application clear. Congress should do so, and
should at the same time answer the various questions posed by the majority and by
legal scholars about how the act will apply to acts committed off United States soil.
Equally important on the Congressional agenda should be a parallel amendment of
254. Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1990, at B8, col. 3. Mr. Paster was referring to the Fifth Circuit decision; nothing in
the Supreme Court opinion would appear to dispel his concerns. Of course theoretically, the fraud and conspir-
acy exceptions would protect against this to some extent, although the fact-dependent nature of those exceptions
will provide little comfort to potential plaintiffs.
255. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988); see President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
256. LEGAL QUOrATIONS 246 (citing 11D.N.B. 237).
257. Indeed, if the majority justices had used Boureslan to announce a new rule, namely that extraterritorial
application occurs only upon express legislative statement, their position would have been far more intellectually
honest than the one they chose, of resurrecting feeble Foley.
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the ADA. Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in passing that the same uncertainty
exists regarding the extraterritorial application of this brand new Act.
The new legislation should, of course, expressly make clear that the employ-
ment rights laws protect American citizens from unlawful discrimination by
American companies acting abroad.2 5 The legislation should spell out that the
EEOC or other investigative agency for the ADA has jurisdiction to investigate
abroad.2"9 Venue rules are already sufficient.28 Congress should adopt, or at least
cite with approval, the standards set out by the EEOC regarding whether or not a
subsidiary is sufficiently separate to be considered a separate company from its
parent. 261
Conflict of laws concerns should perhaps be addressed in more detail, although
the BFOQ defense already provides some relief to employers. An affirmative de-
fense should be created entitled "Compliance with Foreign Law." If an American
company doing business abroad must engage in what would be unlawful discrimi-
nation in America in order to comply with the laws of its host country, compliance
258. Senator E. Kennedy (D. Mass.) has suggested incorporating such an extraterritoriality clause into the lat-
est version of the Civil Rights Restoration Act now pending. At least one political analyst has suggested that the
extraterritoriality provision is so important that its fate ought not to turn on that of the controversial Restoration
Act. Megna, Workers Overseas, Leaf-Chron. (Clarksville, Tenn.), Apr. 15, 1991, at 4A, col. 1.
259. For a discussion of the conflicts between domestic discovery orders and foreign nondisclosure laws, see
Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analyisis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320 (1983).
260. See supra note 115.
261. See supra notes 169-180 and accompanying text. Perhaps Congress should consider regulation of major-
ity-owned foreign affiliates and subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Otherwise Title VII violations will continue to
be easy to commit abroad. See generally, Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp. 637 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980);
Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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with the host country's laws should be a defense. Of course this defense would
need to be construed narrowly.
2 62
An additional casualty of the Boureslan decision is the rule that Title VII juris-
diction is to be liberally construed. Indeed the case is one in a series of cases nar-
rowing the clout of the civil rights laws as tools to empower those who have
traditionally been disenfranchised and victimized, and construing the words of
Title VII against those whom the statute was expressly designed to protect.263 In
his dissent to Ward's Cove Packing, Inc. v. Atonio, 21 Justice Blackmun wrote, "One
wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination -or, more ac-
curately, race discrimination against non-whites -is a problem in our society, or
even remembers that it ever was."265
In view of this trend, Congress should consider further amending Title VII to
include either a statement purpose, a construction guideline, or both. Such a
guideline was included as § 11 of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990,266 which
provided: "All federal laws protecting the civil rights of persons shall be broadly
construed to effectuate the purpose of such laws to eliminate discrimination and
provide effective remedies. 267
262. Various other more difficult issues come to mind and are outside the scope of this article. See generally,
1988 EEOC Policy Statement. Should compliance with foreign customs or social mores be a defense? The danger
is that the defense will swallow the rule. On the other hand it is disturbing to effectively tie the hands of American
businesses trying to compete in global markets. This determination is perhaps best made by the courts on a case
by case basis. Cf Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil
Co., 653 E2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981); EEOC Dec. No. 90-1 (Apr. 10, 1990) ("Absent a conflict of laws
between Title VII and the laws of the host country, U.S. employers may not discriminate against U.S. citizens
abroad in violation of Title VII simply because it conforms to the customs or preferences of that country."); CCH
EEOC Decisions (1973) 1 6317; Kern v. Dynaelectron, 577 F Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), affd mem., 746
F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing religious discrimination in hiring of pilots because under Saudi Arabian laws
non-Muslim pilots flying into Mecca would be beheaded); American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 173 N.E.2d
778, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1959). See also Cherian, Current Developments in Transnational Employment Rights, 40
LAB. L. J. 259 (1989), in which the author points out that certain forms of discrimination may be less prevalent
abroad than Americans might suppose. For instance, data from the International Labor Organization shows al-
most as many women managers and administrators in Latin America as in the United States (14 % vs. 15 %, re-
spectively). For a discussion of the clashes between American and Saudi Arabian law, see Note, United States
Corporations Operating in Saudi Arabia and Laws Affecting Discrimination in Employment: Which Law Shall Pre-
vail?, 8 Loy. V.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 135 (1985). For further discussion, see Comment, Strangers in a Strange
Land: Foreign Compulsion and ExtraterritorialApplication of Unite States Employment Law, 11 Nw. J. OF INT'L L.
& Bus. 371 (1990), which includes a discussion of another employment lawsuit against Aramco.
Another potential problem would concern an allegation that an American company chose to branch into a par-
ticular foreign country because its laws required discrimination against a given group, so that the corporation
would have an excuse to discriminate against the group. Such a claim could even be brought after Boureslan and
without any amendment of Title VII. Presumably this would be an employment practice adopted in America
which had an adverse impact on a given group.
Yet another potential issue is whether United States companies abroad should be permitted to discriminate
against foreign nationals. In other words, should the alien exemption provision be repealed? See Dehner,
Multinational Enterprise and Racial Non-Discrimination: United States Enforcement of an International Human
Right, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (1974).
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A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT
Charles Shanor, former General Counsel for the EEOC, found this particular
clause "deeply troubling."268 Two of his objections go. to vagueness: he wonders
what are included in the "civil rights laws", and he worries that the "provide effec-
tive remedies" directive is a veiled go-ahead for punitive damages.286 These are
valid critiques. The proposal made in this article concerns only Title VII, and the
remedies question is outside the scope of this article. Certainly if Congress intends
to change the remedial provisions of Title VII, the modifications should be ex-
press and clear, not mere hints.
Mr. Shanor also wonders if this proposed provision would affect such decisions
as International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States27 and United
Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Weber.271 He worries that much settled law will be dis-
turbed, thereby enriching lawyers and further overburdening the legal system.
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Yes, such a provision might lead to the rethinking of past cases, which many civil
libertarians might consider long overdue. But Mr. Shanor's mention of Weber is
useful, for it reminds us that even a broad construction of the act in favor of certain
groups should not lead to the unnecessary trammelling of the rights of those in
groups which have traditionally been the dominant "haves" in a given line of work.
A well-written construction clause would indicate which groups the Act was
drafted to protect such as, "those groups which have traditionally been discrimi-
nated against in the job category at issue in the case." Male nurses, black fire-
fighters, and female truck drivers would all thereby be entitled to broader con-
struction of the act. The legislative amendment should also make reference to the
competing concern that innocent third parties should not be unduly thwarted in the
pursuit of their employment goals. In order to explore more fully the delicate bal-
ancing required, Congress might prefer a chattier and more expansive "statement
of purpose" instead of a "construction guideline."
VI. CONCLUSION
The Boureslan majority breathed unwarranted strength into a canon which
oversimplifies a complicated question of statutory construction. The Boureslan
result has narrowed Title VII and limited its effectiveness as a piece of legislation
designed to remedy and prevent employment discrimination. Congress can and
should take steps to overturn Boureslan's effect by expressly providing for extrater-
ritorial application of both Title VII and the ADA.
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